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A long-standing tradition, largely present in both the physical and the philosophical literature, regards the
advent of (special) relativity –with its block-universe picture– as the failure of any indeterministic program in
physics. On the contrary, in this paper, we note that upholding reasonable principles of finiteness of information
hints at a picture of the physical world that should be both relativistic and indeterministic. We thus rebut
the block-universe picture by assuming that fundamental indeterminacy itself should as well be regarded as a
relational property when considered in a relativistic scenario. We discuss the consequence that this view may
have when correlated randomness is introduced, both in the classical case and in the quantum one.
I. RELATIVITY FROM INFORMATION PRINCIPLES
In Newtonian mechanics the interaction of particles is de-
scribed by the potential energy of interaction which is a func-
tion of only the positions of the interacting particles, hence, as
stressed also by Landau and Lifshitz, such a theory “contains
the assumption of instantaneous propagation of interactions”
[1]. They thus motivate the development of the theory of spe-
cial relativity (SR) as to overcome a long-standing problem of
“infinities” (the infinite speed of propagation of the interac-
tions in this case), which affected classical physics.1
In recent years, new attention has been brought to the prob-
lem of having infinite quantities in physical theories [2, 3],
with a special emphasis on the connection between physics
and information [4–12].2 In particular, in Refs. [5, 6, 9, 10,
12, 14], we have pointed out that the usual understanding of
classical (non-relativistic) mechanics rests on the unwarranted
implicit assumption of “infinite precision”, namely, that every
physical quantity has an actual value with its infinite deter-
mined digits (which formally translates into the assumption
that physical variables take values in the real numbers). To
overcome this problem of “infinities”, we have assumed the
“finiteness of information density” (i.e., finite regions of space
cannot contain but finite information) as a foundational princi-
ple, and showed how this leads to fundamental indeterminism
even in classical physics.
Remarkably, also the problem of infinities raised by Landau
and Lifshitz can be addressed by invoking the same principle
of “finiteness of information density”, thus assuming it as an
alternative axiom from which deriving SR. Consider the fol-
lowing two axioms:
P1 – Principle of relativity: The laws of physics have the
same form in every inertial frame of reference.
P2 – Principle of finiteness of information density: A finite
1 Note that SR only deals with mechanics and electromagnetism, whereas to
address similar problems about gravity one has to consider general relativ-
ity.
2 Many of these approaches stem from the assumption of Landauer’s princi-
ple according to which, in short, “information is physical” [13].
volume of space can only contain a finite amount of in-
formation.
From P2 one infers that only a finite amount of information
can be transmitted in a finite time, otherwise this would re-
quire to “move” an infinite volume of space. Hence, the signal
velocity (i.e. the speed of propagation of information) neces-
sarily needs to be finite too. Now, if there is a maximal veloc-
ity,3 from P1, this must be the same in every inertial reference
frame [1]. The former considerations are enough to derive the
whole theory of special relativity (possibly with the further
but quite innocuous assumptions of homogeneity of space and
time and isotropy of space). Incidentally, note that the fact
that this maximal signal velocity is identified with the speed
of light in vacuum does not follow from physical principles,
nor is it required at all to derive SR.4
The Principle of finiteness of information density (P2) has
thus two physical consequences: On the one hand, it imposes
that, in general, physical quantities (say the position of a par-
ticle at a certain moment) do not have perfectly determined
values at every time (or, alternatively, that the truth value of
certain empirical statements, such as “a particle is located at x̄
at a certain instant t̄”, is indeterminate). On the other hand, P2
also imposes a dynamical limit to the propagation of informa-
tion (signal velocity) which, together with P1, allows to fully
derive the theory of SR. Hence, upholding the Principle of
finiteness of information density gives us a hint that physics
should be at the same time indeterministic and relativis-
tic. But are these two worldviews compatible? To answer this
question, in what follows we rephrase, by means of a phys-
ically intuitive scenario, a by now classical argument inde-
pendently put forward by Rietdijk [18] and Putnam [19], that
3 In principle a finite velocity could be unbounded, but we restrict our analy-
sis to the case where there exists a maximal velocity.
4 However, a body moving at the maximal signal velocity would be required
by SR to be massless (see e.g. [15], p. 589). This, together with the em-
pirical demonstration that Maxwell’s equations are invariant under Lorentz
transformations, leads to the identification of the maximal velocity with the
speed of light in vacuum, c. Note that c is not only identified with the speed
of light but it also appears as a natural constant in several other theoretical
frameworks (see [16]), most notably as the speed of propagation of gravi-
tational waves in vacuum. The numerical equivalence of these speeds has
been recently empirically verified with high accuracy [17].
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“illustrate[s] the power of the block-universe picture” [20] by
allegedly showing the incompatibility between (special) rela-
tivity and indeterminism. We then discuss its implicit assump-
tions, pointing out that one of them –which seems innocuous
in Newtonian physics– is problematic in special relativity, thus
making their argument untenable. As we shall see, the con-
sequences of putting together the concepts of indeterminism
and relativity would lead us to conclude that the state of de-
terminacy of a physical (random) variable is relative as well.
The relativity of indeterminacy will be analyzed in the differ-
ent scenarios of classical independent randomness, classically
correlated randomness and quantum correlated randomness.
II. INDETERMINACY IS RELATIVE
A. Locally and independently generated randomness
To discuss indeterminism in the framework of SR, and
rephrase Rietdijk’s and Putnam’s argument, we introduce the
concept of a True Random Number Generator (TRNG), by
which we mean an abstract device that outputs genuinely ran-
dom bits. Namely, before each bit is output, its value is not
only unknown (epistemic uncertainty), but it actually has no
determined value (ontic indeterminacy), even though there
might be a probability distribution associated to the outcome
to be realized (in principle, both at the epistemic and at the
ontic level). More precisely, even having complete knowledge
of (i) the state, i.e. the values of all the variables that may
influence the outcome of the TRNG (this can be in principle
everything that lies in the past light cone of the event asso-
ciated to the generation of the bit), and (ii) of the dynamical
laws that rule the evolution of each and every of said variables,
there is no way to predict with certainty which will be value of
the bit output by the TRNG, not even in principle (see Table
I).
XXXXXXXXXOntic
Epistemic Known a Unknown a
Determinate a 3 3
Indeterminate a 7 3
Table I. Differences between epistemic (un)certainty and ontic
(in)determinacy. The value of a variable a can be known only if it
is determinate.
This is what we mean by true randomness, which clearly
entails indeterminism. In what follows, we will be concerned
solely with the (ontic) indeterminacy that each bit has be-
fore it is output and acquires a definite value (on the contrary,
we will not consider what dynamical laws –deterministic or
otherwise– govern the evolution of the considered systems).
This very concept can be expressed in terms of truth values of
empirical propositions, such that the statement, say, “the value
of the bit j output by the TRNG at time t̄ (in a certain reference
frame) is j = 0” has a definite truth value, either true or false,
only after t̄, whereas it was (ontologically) indeterminate be-
fore, i.e. its truth value is neither true nor false.5 Note that this
makes the law of the excluded middle of classical logic fail,
and it so relates the concept of indeterminacy to mathematical
intuitionism (see [12, 21]).
Figure 1. Space-time diagram (in 1+1 dimensions) illustrating Ri-
etdijk’s and Putnam’s argument for the alleged incompatibility be-
tween special relativity and indeterminism. The observers Alice (A)
and Bob (B) are at rest in the blue reference frame, whereas Charlie
(C) and Debbie (D), also at relative rest, move at a constant speed
in the positive x direction (their transformed reference frame is de-
picted in red). The blue dotted line represents the plane of simul-
taneity in Alice’s and Bob’s rest frame at the instant in which Alice’s
True Random Number Generator outputs the bit a (i.e. when it be-
comes determinate; event A). In the moving reference frame (red),
however, when Charlie overlaps with Bob, he is simultaneous with
Debbie, which in turn overlaps with Alice’s past (event A’) when a
was not yet determinate.
Turning now to SR, with reference to Fig. 1, let us consider
four inertial observers, Alice, Bob, Charlie and Debbie. As-
sume that Alice has a TRNG that outputs a fresh random bit
every minute (locally in her inertial reference frame). Assume
also that Bob, at rest in Alice’s frame, is located at a certain
fix distance from Alice, say, one minute away at light speed
(one light-minute). Charlie and Debbie, at relative rest, move
at a constant speed v with respect to Alice’s and Bob’s frame.
All parties know that Alice’s TRNG outputs a fresh random bit
every minute in her frame, i.e. every 1/γ = 1/
√
1− v2/c2
minutes in Charlie’s and Debbie’s reference frame. Moreover,
the positions and velocity v are tailored such that at 1:00 pm in
both reference frames Charlie’s position lies on Bob’s world-
line (point B ≡ C in Fig. 1), while Debbie’s position overlaps
with Alice’s world-line (point A′ ≡ D in Fig. 1).
5 We refer to propositions (or statement) as empirical because they are about
the values taken by physical variables, i.e. outcomes of hypothetical ex-
periments. However, in principle, we will not immediately disregard also
those statements that refer to not directly empirically accessible quantities
(e.g., a joint proposition about two outcomes of experiments conducted in
space-like separation), which instead would be meaningless to genuine em-
piricists because they are unverifiable.
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Let us denote by a ∈ {0, 1} the bit output by Alice’s TRNG
at 1:00 pm in her reference frame. As explained above, by the
very nature of a TRNG, at any time instant before 1:00 pm, the
proposition “a = 0” has no truth value for Alice (nor for any
possible observer for that matter) but rather is fundamentally
indeterminate. Yet, at 1:00 pm, Alice’s TRNG outputs a fresh
bit that now gets determined for Alice. Is the value of this bit
determined for Bob, too? One may be tempted to answer in the
positive (as in fact Rietdijk and Putnam do), since the events
happening at Alice’s and Bob’s locations, respectively, are si-
multaneous in their rest frames. Of course, Bob may not know
the value of a because Alice may not have communicated it,
or, more fundamentally, because Bob is space-like separated
from Alice. But does the proposition “a = 0” have a truth
value or is it indeterminate for Bob?
Since at 1:00 pm Bob and Charlie are next to each other
–ideally they exactly overlap at the same location– it is plau-
sible to assume that the proposition “a = 0” has the same
truth value for both of them (since this is empirically testable
there is actually no room for any alternatives at the ontological
level). Hence, let’s assume it has a determinate truth value for
Charlie as well. But then, by applying the same reasoning as
before, this implies that the proposition also has a truth value
at all locations simultaneous to Charlie in his inertial frame,
thus it must be determinate for Debbie too. Yet, given the rel-
ative motion between the two reference frames, Debbie over-
laps with Alice’s world line at the space-time point A′ where
her TRNG has not yet output the bit. Hence, following this
chain of inferences, “a = 0” had already a definite truth value
before Alice’s TRNG outputs the bit a, which is a contradic-
tion with the assumption of a TRNG. From this contradiction,
Rietdijk and Putnam concluded that, in general, the structure
of SR does not allow for indeterminate events.
The previous argument, however, relies on two assumptions
that seem prima facie innocuous, which originate from an in-
tuitive extension of classical concepts to a relativistic scenario.
In fact, these assumptions are introduced to characterize what
it means for two (or more) observers to share a determinate
reality (in terms of truth values of propositions). Their as-
sumptions can be made explicit as follows:
1. Local reality: Any two observers that locally overlap
attribute the same truth values to empirical propositions
(including the value “indeterminate”).
2. Present reality: Any two distant observers at rela-
tive rest attribute the same truth values (including the
value “indeterminate”) to empirical propositions about
present events (i.e., lying on the same plane of simul-
taneity in their rest frame).
However, while the former of these assumptions may still be
upheld in SR because any two observers can operationally ver-
ify the consistency of their attributed truth values locally, the
latter assumption becomes questionable. Indeed, we maintain
that the finiteness of the maximum speed of propagation of
any piece of information renders also determinacy (i.e. the
definiteness of the truth values of empirical statements) a re-
lational property. This can be seen by taking any binary func-
tion (e.g. the sum modulo 2) of the statements describing the
outcomes of local physical processes taking place at distant
locations (e.g. the output bits of two distant TRNG’s). It thus
becomes a straightforward assumption that determinacy itself
propagates in space at the maximal signal velocity, i.e. in-
stantaneously in Newtonian physics, but at a finite speed (that
of light) according to relativity. This is where the Rietdijk’s
and Putnam’s argument fails, in the assumption that truth val-
ues are always shared by observers lying on the same plane
of simultaneity, even though this is not verifiable except for
the region enclosed within the intersection of their future light
cones. Hence, in short, (in)determinacy is relative.
Figure 2. Space-time diagram (in 1+1 dimensions) showing that for
distant observers (in)determinacy is relative. Even if each of their lo-
cal TRNG outputs a bit, becoming determinate from indeterminate, it
is only in the overlap of their future light cones that both bits become
determinate. Note that both a = 0 and b = 0 are indeterminate in the
entire white region.
In our simple example, this means that at 1:00 pm the propo-
sition “a = 0” has no definite truth value for Bob, nor for
Charlie, but it is for them still indeterminate, as it was for Alice
before 1:00 pm. It is only one minute later, i.e. at 1:01 pm, that
“a = 0” acquires a definite truth value for Bob, though Bob
may still not know this value. For instance, if Bob also holds
a TRNG –here assumed to generate randomness locally and
independently of Alice’s TRNG– which also outputs a fresh
random bit, denoted by b, every minute, then the value of their
sum modulo 2, a⊕b, is indeterminate everywhere until 30 sec-
onds after 1:00 pm (in their common inertial frame), and the
proposition “a = b” has no truth value, i.e. is indeterminate,
until then (see Fig. 2).
Note that the present rebuttal of Rietdijk’s and Putnam’s ar-
gument is in agreement with those put forward by Stein and
Savitt, respectively [22, 23].
B. “Classical” correlated randomness
In the previous section, we have argued that contrarily to
a well-known philosophical argument, indeterminism and rel-
ativity remain compatible, insofar as the (in)determinacy of
the values taken by physical variables, each measured by a
distinct relativistic observer, is relative. So far, however, we
limited our analysis to the assumption that each TRNG gener-
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ates random bits at its local position and independently from
any other random generators. Yet, one can in principle envi-
sion a form of “classical” correlated randomness between two
or more TRNG’s, which will help bridge the gap between the
classical and the quantum case.6
Let us thus consider once more two distant observers, Alice
and Bob, each provided with a TRNG such that their respec-
tive bits a and b take one of their two possible values with
equal probability, i.e. p(a = 0) = p(a = 1) = 12 = p(b =
0) = p(b = 1). However, when considered jointly, some
correlations between the bits output by the two TRNG may
have been established.7 For example, although at the local
level the values of the bits are random with uniform distribu-
tion, there could be a bias towards certain joint results. For
instance, the cases when their values are the same could occur
with a higher probability, say p(a = b) = 34 . One can think
that at the ontological level there is a physical property such as
a (non-local) propensity –i.e. an objective tendency that quan-
tifies the bias towards the possible realization of an indeter-
ministic outcome– that accounts for the correlations between
the two TRNG.8 Due to the space-like separation between Al-
ice and Bob, there exist inertial reference frames in which
Alice’s TRNG generates a random bit, say a = 0, before
Bob’s one (which thus remains indeterminate in such reference
frames). But because of the correlations between TRNG’s,
within the future light cone of Alice, the propensity for Bob
to find the outcome 0 gets updated from p(b = 0) = 12 to
p(b = 0|a = 0) = 34 . On the other hand, in a reference frame
in which the realization of a fresh bit by Bob’s TRNG comes
first, it is the propensity for the outcome of Alice’s TRNG that
gets updated according to the established correlations. Note
that the realization of a fresh bit by a local TRNG, say, on
Alice’s side, does not directly affect the value of the bits gen-
erated on Bob’s side (otherwise this could be used to signal).
It is Alice’s propensity for the outcome of Bob’s TRNG that
gets updated, such that if she obtains a = 0, within her future
light cone the propensity associated to the statement b = 0
will change (to 3/4 in this case). In this way, when Alice’s bit
gets determinate, also the propensity for the value of b rela-
tive to Alice’s future light cone gets determinate, but not the
value of b. It is only within the intersection of the future light
cones of Alice and Bob that their outcomes unambiguously
assume a definite value which ought to comply with this non-
local propensity.
The reader acquainted with quantum physics would have
already noticed the similarity of this “classical” non-local ran-
domness with quantum correlations. However, we wanted
here to express a hypothetical property of indeterminacy
which can be conceptually introduced independently of quan-
tum theory (although we do observe it experimentally in quan-
tum systems and not in classical ones). Before moving to
6 Here by “classical” we mean without introducing the structure of quantum
probabilities, but merely consider systems whose outcomes are correlated
through randomness.
7 We do not discuss here possible physical mechanisms that may establish
this kind of correlations, but we assume that in principle these can exist.
8 This is inspired by the propensity interpretation of probability which was
introduced by Popper [24]; see also [6] for a recent application of this con-
cept to indeterministic physics.
the quantum case, we deem it useful to consider the so-called
Popescu-Rohrlich (PR) boxes [25], because, contrarily to the
indeterministic scenarios so far discussed (in terms of TRNG),
they admit the choice of inputs that is crucial in the quan-
tum case (i.e., the choice of the measurement basis). PR
boxes are a theoretical model of an operational setup that dis-
plays the maximal amount of correlated (non-local) random-
ness which however does not lead to instantaneous signal-
ing (i.e. it respects the no-signaling conditions). In terms
of correlations between two distant parties –which carry out
local operations (i.e. they chose an input bit x and y, respec-
tively) and measure an outcome of some not fully specified
random process (indicated by the bits a and b, respectively)–
the no-signaling conditions are given by the fact that the input
choice (which in turn could be picked according to local and
independent TRNGs) of one party cannot directly influence
the outcome of the other one. PR boxes are a set of corre-
lations p(a, b|x, y) defined as follows: if the pair of inputs,
(x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)}, then the outputs are perfectly
correlated, i.e., p(0, 0|x, y) = p(1, 1|x, y) = 1/2. Otherwise,
if the input pair (x, y) = (1, 1), the outcomes are perfectly
anti-correlated, i.e., p(0, 1|1, 1) = p(1, 0|1, 1) = 1/2. It is
straightforward to show that these correlations respect the no-
signaling conditions. Accordingly, if, for example, x = 0 and
a = 0, then the propensity pA(b|x, y, a) = 1 (i.e., in this case
b = 0), where the superscript index indicates Alice’s future
light cone, but p(b|y) = 1/2 everywhere else.
C. Quantum correlated randomness
In the previous sections, we have discussed different “clas-
sical” scenarios that bring together true randomness (i.e., in-
determinism) and special relativity, reaching the conclusion
that (in)determinacy is relative. Moreover, in the case of cor-
related randomness between two TRNGs, there are regions
of space-time in which different inertial observers attribute,
in general, different probabilities for measurement outcomes
(corresponding to different objective propensities), and it is
only in the overlap between their future light cones that their
predictions match (where they also become testable). How-
ever, it would be impossible to discuss indeterminism without
addressing quantum physics, which not only is the most suc-
cessful theory ever in terms of predictions, but also a theory
that hints at the indeterministic nature of our world. Indeed,
the violation of Bell’s inequalities [26] has proven that if there
is at least a random event in the universe, then there can be ar-
bitrarily many of them [27] (see also [6] for a discussion), and
even that classical trajectories of particles cannot exist prede-
termined (if one upholds locality) [28]. Moreover, in a recent
work, Dragan and Ekert showed that elementary special rela-
tivistic considerations can lead to quantum randomness [29].
Hence, we now introduce quantum (non-local) correlations,
that is, what happens if Alice’s and Bob’s TRNGs are entan-
gled? Assume an initial maximally entangled state, say the
singlet |Ψ−〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉 |1〉 − |1〉 |0〉), where |0〉 and |1〉
are eigenstates of σz , and the first qbit is with Alice and the
second with Bob. When Alice measures her local qbit in an
arbitrary basis, say the x-basis (recall that |Ψ−〉 has the same
form in every basis), she obtains, for example, the outcome
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a = 0, corresponding to the state |0〉x. While Bob’s local
quantum state remains unchanged, Alice describes, after her
measurement, the global state using the projection postulate,
i.e. it becomes |0〉x |1〉x. Symmetrically, however, Bob locally
measures his qbit, which is still in the initial entangled state
|Ψ−〉, in the y-basis, and obtains, say, outcome b = 0, cor-
responding to |0〉y . By using the projection postulate, he up-
dates the global state to |1〉y |0〉y , while Alice’s state remains
unchanged. Since Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are carried
out in space-like separation, there are inertial reference frames
in which one measurement occurs before the other and vice
versa, from which we conclude that there are certain regions
of space-time in which the global quantum state as assigned
by Alice and Bob differ. At the intersection of the respective
future light cones, however, the two bits acquire their value
and the quantum state is reduced to |0〉x |0〉y , which reconciles
with the usual projection postulate. In the way here described,
the state is well defined at every point in space-time, but in
every inertial frame there are regions of space-time where two
different states are attributed to the two qbits. Notice that the
probabilities of the two outcomes a and b are correlated, as
usual in quantum mechanics (if one performs local measure-
ment in two bases which are not mutually unbiased): this is
non-local randomness [30], but the states change only locally.
Figure 3. Space-time diagram (in 1+1 dimensions) showing a rela-
tivistic scenario (readapted from Ref. [32]) in which different global
quantum state are assigned in different regions of space-time.
Our view is similar to that of Aharonov and Albert, who,
in a series of papers [31–33], pointed out the inadequacy of
the standard quantum state-vector description for multipartite
systems in a relativistic scenario. We thus deem worth to
rephrase, in the language of the present paper, one of the ex-
amples they gave in Ref. [32]. With reference to Fig. 3, let
Alice, Bob and Charlie be located at three distant locations
and share a tripartite entangled W-state |α〉 ∝ |1〉 |0〉 |0〉 +
|0〉 |1〉 |0〉 + |0〉 |0〉 |1〉, (normalization is omitted) which can
be seen as the Fock representation of a single particle in a
quantum superposition between the three different locations
(entanglement with vacuum). In a certain reference frame,
a measurement is performed on the first qbit at t1 revealing
that the particle is not located at Alice’s position (formally
this means to apply to Alice’s qbit the projector |0〉〈0|). The
global state thus gets updated to |β〉 ∝ |0〉 (|1〉 |0〉 + |0〉 |1〉).
A second measurement is then performed, at time t2, on the
second qbit, revealing that the particles is also not located at
Bob’s location. This leaves the global state in |γ〉 = |0〉 |0〉 |1〉.
Given the space-like separation of these events, however, there
exists another reference frame, in which the measurements
happen in reversed order. In that frame, the initial state is
the Lorentz transformed of |α〉, which we indicate by |α′〉.
The first measurement happens at t′2 and leads to the up-
dated state |η〉 ∝ |1′〉 |0′〉 |0′〉 + |0′〉 |0′〉 |1′〉) and then, after
the second measurement at time t′1, to the final global state
|γ′〉 = |0′〉 |0′〉 |1′〉. This shows that the intermediate states
|β〉 and |η〉, which describe the tripartite system in the period
in between the two measurements in their respective reference
frames, differ in a way that they are not the Lorenz transformed
of one another.
III. OUTLOOK
We have argued that, under the reasonable assumption of
finiteness of information density, physics should comply with
both indeterminism and relativity. Notwithstanding some his-
torical criticisms, we have shown that these two views are
compatible if one regards (in)determinacy itself as relative.
Our analysis was based on the formulation of indeterminacy in
terms of a third logical truth value (besides “true” and “false”)
for empirical propositions. This is thus reminiscent of math-
ematical intuitionism, where the law of the excluded middle
fails [12, 21].
Despite these promising preliminary conclusions, a num-
ber of fundamental questions concerning a hypothetical phys-
ical framework that would bring together special relativity and
indeterminism (possibly independently of quantum mechan-
ics) remain open. For example, if we enforce the principle
of finiteness of information density, the concept of a relativis-
tic “event”, usually defined as a (mathematical) point in the
Minkowski space-time, would need to be substituted by a fi-
nite hypervolume. This implies that also light cones would
not be perfectly determined, but their edges would be some-
how blurred; does this mean that the future determinacy of
physical variables is also not perfectly determined? To this
end, following the principle of finiteness of information den-
sity, we have introduced in previous works [5, 6] a concrete
model of indeterministic classical (non-relativistic) physics.
This was achieved by replacing the usual real numbers –which
are customarily assumed to be the values taken by physical
quantities– with what we named “finite information quanti-
ties” (FIQs). It would be interesting to analyze in details what
would be the consequences of introducing FIQs in the context
of special relativity.
Furthermore, in an indeterministic worldview, one would
have to reconcile the apparent need for a discretized time –due
to a series of genuine acts of creation when potentiality be-
comes actuality– with the continuous geometry of space-time
entailed by relativity (see [34] for a work in this direction).
Note, however, that we do not argue for a fundamental dis-
cretization of space-time, we agree that continuity is an irre-
placeable feature in relativity theory, but we maintain that the
continuum is retrieved similarly to Brouwer’s “viscous con-
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tinuum” in intuitionistic mathematics, wherein numbers that
constitute the continuum are processes that get more and more
determinate as time passes [12]. Can this proposed approach
in terms of finite information help go beyond the standard rela-
tivistic block-universe picture, in which time is a mere illusion,
and support instead Reichenbach’s view according to which
“the parallelism [between space and time] does not exist ob-
jectively and that in natural science time is more fundamental
than space”? [20, 35].
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